Immigration, Integration, and Public Opinion in the European Union by Jozwiak, Andreas
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the
European Union
Volume 2012 2012 Article 11
April 2013
Immigration, Integration, and Public Opinion in
the European Union
Andreas Jozwiak
Trinity University, ajozwiak@trinity.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu
Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, International Relations Commons,
and the Politics and Social Change Commons
This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more
information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jozwiak, Andreas (2012) "Immigration, Integration, and Public Opinion in the European Union," Claremont-UC Undergraduate
Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2012, Article 11. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201201.11
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/11
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 125
9
immigration, integration, and public 
opinion in the european union
andreas Jozwiak
Trinity University
Abstract
The politics of immigration and integration pose significant and interrelated chal-
lenges for the continued growth and success of the European Union. This paper explores 
that connection by means of a literature review and a regression analysis. While the literature 
explores in depth each issue separately, I conclude that public opinion moves in the same 
direction; that is, a person that views the EU favorably is most likely going to view immigra-
tion positively. This is for a number of reasons, the most important of which relates to how 
citizens perceive their national identity, as both integration and immigration are threats upon 
national sovereignty. I find that variables such as a nation’s ‘foreign policy’ tradition, educa-
tion, and left/right positioning are also important factors, while most other socioeconomic 
data are not significant.
Keywords
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As the European Union has expanded and brought prosperity to the continent, both 
member states and the EU have to contend with immigration to the community from 
the East and South. But because of the structure of the EU, it has to negotiate the internal 
politics of deeper integration to solve these problems. As EU integration has evolved, elites, 
whose priorities have differed from those of citizens, have to a great extent controlled in-
tegration and immigration (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Lahav, 2004; Philip, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the way in which public opinion shapes national and European level politics is 
very important because of the interplay between national and supranational policy making 
institutions. Furthermore, there are important connections between public opinion on im-
migration and integration. Both issues can be seen as encroachments on national sovereignty 
and identity. Immigration (people coming from the outside) is ideologically inextricably 
related to European integration (people from outside ruling over the nation). Immigration, 
therefore, highlights the challenge faced by European Union integration in terms of the 
extent to which the EU can become truly one unit (Lahav, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). 
Using both literature and public opinion data, this paper will demonstrate that the factors 
(economic, cultural, historical, and political) that determine citizen’s attitudes towards inte-
gration are similar to those that guide their decision on immigration.
Institutional Interplay and Integration
Because of the way the European Union is structured, there is a ‘democracy deficit’ 
that is endemic of its supranational structure. Only one branch, the European Parliament, 
with relatively little power, is an elected body. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) and Lahav 
(2004) argue that elites, who have controlled European Union integration under the Monet 
method, and the public disagree significantly on immigration issues. European citizens, by 
and large, did not have a say in or a role in the creation of an integrated Europe. Elites in the 
EU have had significant control on immigration policy and have liberalized it. These ‘Euro-
crats’ are able to take a much more liberal stance on immigration because they do not face 
electoral pressure in the way national legislatures and administrations are held accountable 
to decisions made (Luedtke, 2008). The European Parliament can vote on many decisions, 
but because of the consensus-seeking nature of the Union, policy makers are often not held 
accountable to public opinion. In addition, the democracy deficit in the EU does not con-
fer legitimacy upon the EU’s institutions in the eyes of the people, and thus they may feel 
threatened by its encroachment. Overall, the EU has been the liberalizing force in European 
politics, fighting over time, for example, for free movement of labor and integration among 
other political objectives, while national governments are keen on blocking unwanted immi-
gration and preserving some core elements of their power, such as foreign policy. According 
to Philip (1994), the EU seems to be winning this battle and will continue to win, as suc-
cessive waves of integration have prompted national governments to cede power to the EU. 
The most recent example of this is in the Eurozone crisis, where the rhetoric surrounding 
the crisis has called for deeper fiscal integration. 
The connector between attitudes towards immigration and integration is the power 
struggle and dynamics of the relationship between individual nations and the EU. No com-
mon immigration policy exists among European Union states, although many suggest that 
this is necessary to secure borders (Zimmerman, 1995; Huntoon, 1998). Most nations have 
given the EU control over issues such as the environment, and at first wanted to give the EU 
control over immigration, but most nations feel their identity being threatened if they do 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/11
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 127
not have control over issues such as VAT (Value Added Tax) and immigration (Lahav, 2004). 
Another important issue relevant to immigration and integration debates concerns 
the granting of citizenship, which remains firmly in the hands of individual member states. 
While member states can grant citizenship, the free movement policy of the EU dictates 
that these newly minted citizens can move to another EU nation where they are granted 
social rights (Philip 1994). This fact further politicizes immigration because member states, 
as a result of the Schengen agreement, rely upon one another to safeguard their external 
borders. This first became a problem with the entry of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in 1981 
and 1986 respectively, with EU citizens worrying about an influx of Spaniards and other 
immigrants into their countries with more generous welfare states (Philip, 1994). This lends 
itself to be compared to the eastern expansion of the EU in 2004 and similar concerns about 
immigration from the newly annexed East. Finally, related to citizenship is the concept of 
a national and European identity. Public perception of European identity is still very weak 
compared to national identity. The fact remains that the relationship between “citizenship” 
and “nation-state” remains much stronger than the relationship between “EU” and “citizen-
ship” (Odmalm, 2007). This encapsulates the great debates over citizenship, immigration, and 
integration.
Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration and Integration
There are two main areas in the literature that researchers refer to when discussing 
attitudes towards the EU and immigration. They are cultural and national identity (and the 
associated problems of racism and prejudice), and economics. These are interrelated and 
are summarized in Quillian (1995; 1996) in Kessler and Freeman (2005) who finds that, 
“perceived threat, understood as a function of economic conditions and of the size of the 
subordinate group relative to the dominant group, is an important determinant of variations 
in prejudice” (p. 828). Therefore, we would expect cultures that are isolationist, such as the 
United Kingdom, combined with a poor perception of the economic situation would en-
gender unfavorable opinion of the EU and immigrants.
A poor or deteriorating economic situation is a cause typically understood to lead 
toward protectionist measures and anti-immigrant sentiment. According to Kessler and Free-
man (2005), generally, in poorer economic conditions the public tends to be more protec-
tionist and display more anti-immigrant tendencies. In addition, concerns about national 
unemployment or pressure on the host country’s social tension and welfare system may drive 
public opinion against immigrants (Lahav, 2004; Philip, 1994; Kessler & Freeman, 2005). 
For example, Mayda (2004) finds that low skilled workers in high GDP nations are more 
apt to be more anti-immigration, as there is a perception of competition. However, there 
is a crucial difference between appearance and reality, as most research points to the fact 
that perception of increasing unemployment rather than actual changes in unemployment 
is more important in swaying public opinion (Kessler and Freedman, 2005, Lahav, 2004; 
Zimmermann, 1995). In fact, some studies, such as Kessler and Freeman (2005) and Lahav 
(2004) failed to show any connection between immigration and a decrease in employment. 
Huntoon (1998) rightfully argues that EU nations need immigrants to fill shortages in lower 
paying jobs. On the other hand, more trade within the European community, according to 
Masso (2009), tends to be a trigger that promotes more favorable attitudes towards European 
integration. This is one of the best tools the European Union has at its disposal to foster 
favorable views of the EU, as trade and improved economic performance is one of the true 
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benefits of European integration. 
Much of the literature on feelings towards immigrants and deeper integration also 
points to a couple of intangible factors that matter in constructing public opinion (Mayda, 
2004; McLaren, 2002). This intangible is a perceived threat to a nation’s identity and culture. 
The research here is divided in two areas: the first discusses the creation within a nation of 
in- and out-groups of society, where the out-groups are treated with hostility (de Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2005; Kessler & Freeman, 2005). This could be attributed to high concentra-
tions of immigrants in a neighborhood or city, especially in societies where immigration 
levels have outpaced national growth, a common predicament of many EU member states 
(Lahav, 2004; Gang et al., 2002; Kessler & Freeman, 2005; Zimmerman, 1995). The second 
group of research focuses on the perceived cultural threat to a nation not stemming from 
threats to individuals lives, but to the nation as a whole, and is a result of attachment to 
groups, identities, and nationalism (McLaren, 2002; Lahav, 2004). Hooghe and Marks (2004) 
raise interesting questions in terms of identity creation and how it affects attitudes towards 
both integration and immigration. They propose that how individuals construct their iden-
tity is the determining factor. For example, their perceptions of national identity as exclusive 
or inclusive along with attitudes towards multiculturalism are most important. These feelings 
and the need to create strong sense of national or regional identity that shield them from 
the outside might stem from Europeans’ eurocentrism and long held sense of inferiority that 
Peter O’Brien discusses (2009). The relationship between public opinion on immigration 
and integration is clear – people who feel threatened by the outside by either immigrants or 
an encroaching power will naturally tend to be more aggressively supportive of their national 
government, which is closer to home. 
Additionally, research on integration and immigration has also dealt with national-level 
issues, such as politics and history as factors. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) create a measure 
they call a foreign policy tradition that will help determine whether or not countries will 
be supportive of the EU. They prove that Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have 
traditionally been insular and will therefore not support the EU or be very favorable towards 
an influx of immigration. This is noteworthy especially for the United Kingdom, as their 
wariness of immigration is contradictory to the economic necessity of letting in new im-
migrants (Haynes, 2011). On the other hand, France, the Netherlands, and Italy will look to 
the EU for a voice, security, and prosperity because they have a tradition of openness. The 
Dutch in particular have been accepting of supranational institutions and therefore tend to 
be more europositive. 
Previous research on European integration and immigration issues deals with the role 
national politics play in shaping decisions and opinion. The effects of these sentiments are 
exhibited mainly in the right/left divide of the political spectrum and the resurgence and 
growing popularity of right wing parties (Kessler & Freeman, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2002). This attests that immigration is a major issue that has been over-
looked by the main parties and thus is being carried to the center stage by right wing parties, 
usually identified as fringe parties, who are usually both anti-immigrant and anti-EU (de 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). Furthermore, their rising power suggests that immigration 
and integration are huge issues within the EU. For example, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) 
point out the case of Denmark in 1989, where Euroskeptic parties made significant electoral 
gains, and therefore the Maastricht Treaty, the founding treaty of the EU, was voted down in 
a referendum. A more recent reflection of euroskepticism and anti-integration sentiment is 
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in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections of 2009, in which a new group of euroskeptic 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) came into parliament and formed the fourth 
largest grouping in the EP, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. In short, par-
ties in power do make a difference in constructing (or mirroring) public sentiment on EU 
integration. This group is both conservative (and thus also relatively anti-immigration) and 
anti-EU, which shows that on the right side of the spectrum, there is a cohesive ideology that 
opposes threats to national sovereignty and identity from the outside. 
Hooghe and Marks (2002) see these politics of integration through a new left/right 
split in politics. The authors write that parties have been challenged as European politics 
have become a major issue in the domestic political sphere. They first look at the traditional 
Left/Right split in domestic parties, and propose an inverted U model in which centrist 
parties tend to be pro-integration, while parties towards either extreme have been Euro-
skeptic. However, the authors also look beyond the traditional left/right split and examine 
what they call the “green/alternative/libertarian” and “traditional/authoritarian/nationalist” 
poles, in which issues such as lifestyle, the environment, nationalism, and immigration are 
important. Again trying to predict support for integration by measuring a party’s proximity 
to either pole, they found that the strongest correlation was found between Traditional-
ist/Authoritarian/Nationalist (or TAN) parties, who are anti-immigration, were also most 
against EU integration, while Green/Alternative/ Libertarian (or GAL) parties tend to be 
more pro-integrationist, though much less strongly so. They explain that these parties are 
more issue-driven and they are more reserved in their support because of the democracy 
deficit in the EU. Finally, they argue that domestic parties are constrained by the same issues 
on the national and EU level and that European politics have, in a way, become domestic. 
Case Study: Immigration and Integration in Southern Europe
As is evident, the public opinion on immigration and integration is closely related. 
However, the arguments made for this are on a rather abstract level, and a close examination 
of a European Union member state, such as Spain, can help to underscore some of these 
points. Spain is an interesting case study because it is europositive and a large receiver of 
immigrants. Since its accession to the European Union in 1986, it has benefitted massively 
from the huge amount of EU structural funding that has flowed into Spain. This investment, 
according to Oscar Martinez Tapia (2011), has led Spain to being one of the more europosi-
tive nations. Europositivism does not necessarily translate to support for deeper integration, 
but it signals openness to European institutions. This, however, seems to be strongly related 
to money; and Oscar Tapia (2011) worried that in the next few years, as Spain becomes a net 
contributor to the EU, support for the EU would erode. At the same time, Spain is also en-
during one of the worst economic crises in history; it has problems with its debt but also has 
underlying structural problems such as youth unemployment at over 40%. Another speaker 
on immigration, Joacquin Arango (2011), argued that Spanish culture has also historically 
been open to immigration. This is reflected in their legal system where immigrants, once 
they are registered, have access to social benefits and welfare. In addition, Spanish immigra-
tion policy is far more liberal than overall EU immigration legislation as it provides wel-
fare benefits to undocumented immigrants. Interestingly, although one would expect public 
opinion in a crisis to turn against immigrants and the outside world (i.e., the EU), Spanish 
opinion has remained relatively unchanged on immigration. Finally, public opinion on the 
right-wing, where euroskepticism and anti-immigration sentiment tend to be found, does 
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not have a true outlet in Spanish politics, as there is only one (mainstream) conservative party. 
This is what Koopmans et al. (2005) refers to as an opportunity structure, where the politi-
cal embodiment of anti-immigrant sentiment, for example, is constrained (but also given a 
launchpad) by extant political and social structures.
Spanish public opinion seems to be fairly contradictory – poor economic situations 
do not usually coincide with openness to foreigners and the European Union. While this 
would seem to indicate that factors of immigration and integration attitudes do not always 
align, it shows that national tradition (which encompasses Europositivism and tolerance for 
immigration), in this case, is a stronger explanatory variable than economic performance 
in guiding citizens’ opinions. Their national tradition was born out of a particular context; 
Spain for a long time was a net receiver of European Union funding. However, their tradi-
tion of tolerance, not only of immigrants, comes from a long history of changes in ethnic 
groups, religions, and political control, and therefore national tradition can be said to have a 
strong influence on Spain’s overall views on integration and immigration. 
Spain is in many ways special and in contrast with Italy (and possibly most of Europe), 
where the economic downturn has created mistrust in the national government and Eu-
ropean institutions for their inability to solve the crisis. Furthermore, Italy has had a very 
conservative government and has many right-wing parties, giving voice to those who op-
pose European integration and immigration. In addition, Italy hardly can be said to have an 
‘immigration policy,’ despite its position on the Mediterranean. Roughly every four years it 
grants amnesty to immigrants already living in the country, thus providing no incentive for 
legal entry. According to Flavia Piperno (2011), a student at the European University Insti-
tute in Florence, Italy extends no social rights for immigrants, does not have an integration 
plan for them, and has problems with anti-immigrant violence. In addition, they have over 
time become more and more euroskeptic, as their confidence in European institutions has 
gradually decreased. Italy, today, exemplifies the expected outcome of an economic crisis: 
anti-immigrant sentiment and a more protectionist outlook. 
Public Opinion Data and Immigration and Integration
In the next part of the paper, I use Eurobarometer public opinion data from 2008 in an 
attempt to demonstrate how interrelated attitudes towards integration and immigration are. 
The dependent variable in this model is a question from the Eurobarometer survey which 
asks, “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by (NATONAL-
ITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU?” Immigration is one of these subcategories of 
the question. This question is useful as it connects the issues of immigration and integra-
tion. The independent variables in the study include country level variables such immigrant 
populations within member states, socio-economic variables, and questions on the percep-
tion citizens have of the EU that are typical of integration studies. This model will primar-
ily show how related the issues are by showing how integration and immigration variables 
guide citizen’s opinions in the same direction. 
Procedure
The study is based on the Eurobarometer survey, which surveys Europeans on a bian-
nual basis on a range of issues. This study uses a Eurobarometer that focuses on globalization, 
the European Parliament, and further EU integration. This and all Eurobarometer surveys 
were also administered in Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey and Turkish Cyprus among the other 
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EU member states. In order to produce results that accurately reflect attitudes towards EU 
integration and immigration from within the community records from non-EU nations 
were removed from the analysis. 
Because many of these variables in the model seem similar, I took steps to ensure that 
they are not misread or misleading. I addressed the issue of multicolinearity by running a 
series of bivariate correlations among the independent variables to ensure that none of the 
correlations was above .7, which could have indicated such a relationship and produced 
skewed results.
Finally, the dependent variable in the study is bivariate; it asks people if they prefer 
national (coded 1) or EU level (coded 0) decisions making on immigration issues. Because 
the variable is bivariate, I ran a logistic model rather than a linear regression model. All of the 
variables helped provide an explanation of what factors drive people to their beliefs about 
immigration decision making. 
Results
Table 1. Variables in the Equation
Variable B S.E. Wald Exp(B)
Dummy_DK 0.464 0.076 36.962 1.591
Dummy_UK 0.443 0.089 24.546 1.557
EU_image4 0.369 0.023 253.13 1.446
EU_mem_benefit2 0.288 0.043 45.83 1.334
EU_inefficient 0.265 0.036 55.345 1.303
EU_Protect 0.197 0.027 53.078 1.218
Educ_3 0.085 0.018 21.752 1.088
conservative_govt* 0.073 0.044 2.681 1.076
Unemp_financial* 0.055 0.098 0.315 1.056
LR_placement 0.036 0.008 22.3 1.037
important_immig* 0.033 0.064 0.264 1.033
perc_nonEU_immig 0.018 0.004 19.877 1.018
sitaution_financial -0.16 0.026 39.29 0.852
unemp_2* -0.308 0.283 1.185 0.735
dummy_NL -0.284 0.08 12.719 0.752
dummy_France -0.74 0.092 64.906 0.477
* Sig (p-value) >.05
The author’s calculations of data from Papacostas, A. Eurobarometer 70.1: October-November 2008.
The dependent variable in this study was bivariate and consequently run through a 
logistic model. The model yielded statistics that helped determine whether or not the re-
gression model was valid. The Omnibus Chi-Square for this model was 1332.214, and was 
statistically significant (p = .000). The model also returned two R-squared figures. The Cox 
& Snell R Squared produced a value of .078, while the Nagelkerke R Squared returned a 
higher value at .106. This means the model explains 7.8% or 10.6% of the variation. The very 
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high, statistically significant Chi-Square for this model (as well as its significance) indicates 
the model is relatively strong in explaining why people choose national or EU decision mak-
ing on immigration issues.
For each of the variables in the model the findings are interpreted in terms of the likeli-
hood that a change in the dependent variable will occur as a result of any given independent 
variable. For example, I used the exp(B) in the model (for educ_3, a scale of education, with 
higher education levels coded in descending order, 1.088), subtracted 1 from it (.088), and 
multiplied it by 100 to obtain a percentage, 8.8%. Therefore, with increasing levels of educa-
tion, people will, with each level of education (high school, some college, college), be 8.8% 
more likely to support EU legislation. 
Findings/Discussion
The stronger predictors of a policy-making level preference in this study were the 
national level variables (dummy_DK/NL/UK/France). People living in Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, for example, were 59.1 and 55.7 percent more likely to support national-
level legislation on immigration than the EU ‘average,’ while citizens of the Netherlands and 
France were 24.8 and 52.3 percent less likely to support national legislation. These results 
point to the fact that ‘national traditions’ are very important in determining people’s prefer-
ences on policy making. This is also revealing of a nation’s attitudes towards immigration. 
The United Kingdom and Denmark have been slightly less accepting of immigration and 
thus would want to control it with national legislation, while more ‘liberal’ immigrant re-
ceiving states prefer more liberal EU legislation. 
Socioeconomic variables (unemp_2, unemp_financial, financial_situation) in this model 
did not factor significantly into people’s decision-making processes. This is not surprising 
because they relate to a person’s actual situation, and not to their or their nation’s perceived 
economic situation, which, according to the literature, would explain their preferences more 
clearly. The only significant variable was education, whereby a lower education level led to 
increasing inclination to support national legislation. This was very significant, as it shows 
that, by and large, more education, which presumably means more exposure to the EU and 
knowledge of its institution, will lead people to be more accepting of integration and im-
migration. 
Finally, the variables relating to support for the European Union were all significant. 
The variables measuring support for the Union were: EU_image4 (a four point scale of a 
positive or negative view of the EU), EU_mem_ben_2 (a yes/no question asking if they think 
EU accession has benefitted their country), EU_protect (asking if citizens felt the EU protect-
ed them), and EU_inefficient (asking if they felt the EU was efficient). In all cases, responses 
that related to a sense of confidence in the European Union translated to greater support for 
European Union level legislation on immigration, while a lack of confidence consistently 
characterized a preference for national legislation. 
Another major factor in a person’s decision making was their placement on the left to 
right spectrum. This measure was on a 1 to 9 scale, and with each increase in unit of con-
servatism (as the scale moves to 9), the likelihood of a person supporting national legislation 
increased by 3.7%. While this may seem small, the overall increase in likelihood that they 
support national decisions was 33.3% from position one to position nine. This is relevant 
because it not only points towards conservative or liberal opinions on integration, but it also 
is an important explanatory variable for attitudes on immigration issues. 
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Two variables were created with data entered from outside sources. The first one, con-
servative_govt, was meant to determine whether or not having a conservative government 
in power nationally affected citizen’s preferences, but it seemed not to have an effect, as its 
explanatory power was statistically insignificant. The other, perc_nonEU_immig, recorded the 
percentage of non EU citizens in each EU member state, was statistically significant in the 
model. This variable shows that with every one percentage unit increase in immigrants from 
outside the EU, we can expect a 1.8% increase in citizen’s favoring national legislation. This 
largely agrees with the literature that large immigrant populations tend to turn national 
public opinion against immigration as a whole. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, immigration and integration can be seen as threats on a nation’s culture 
and sovereignty from the outside, and in some way change the nature of the traditional 
European nation-state. The European Union has been trying to forge a “European” rather 
than a national identity and its growth has led to the weakening of the nation’s government. 
Similarly, immigration from outside the European Union is seen as a threat economically 
and culturally. Citizens are worried about the strain immigrants put on the social system and 
the jobs they could be taking from nationals. Additionally, immigrants change the face of the 
nation and they can be perceived to threaten the traditional social fabric and culture.
Although this model cannot predict people’s attitudes on intangible factors such as how 
a person views his or her national identity, it attempts to shed some light on the relationship 
between people’s personal characteristics and their views on integration and immigration. 
This statistical model and the literature done on public opinion on immigration and integra-
tion exemplify how the many factors that play into people’s attitudes towards immigration 
and integration are, by and large, the same and point in the same direction on both issues. 
For example, higher levels of education relate to higher levels of tolerance for immigrants 
(because they are no longer a threat at a high skill level) and more knowledge (or support) 
of the EU. Other factors include national traditions, socioeconomic variables (though, as the 
model and research agree, this has more to do with a perception rather than reality), and a 
person’s political standpoint and identity. This connection between the two topics is highly 
relevant as the European Union faces unprecedented challenges as a result of the Eurozone 
financial crisis and external factors, such as the Arab Spring. The European Union, as a result 
of its structure, will forever have to contend with the politics of immigration and integration, 
and public opinion (and thereby democracy) is likely to play a larger role in determining the 
future of the Union.
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